The Army never goes to war without the other services, particularly the U.S. Air Force. Hence, Starry engaged his counterpart at the then-Tactical Air Command, Gen. Wilbur L. Creech, in a number of initiatives to seek the best possible agreements for offensive air support, battlefield air interdiction, suppression of enemy air defenses and joint attack of the second echelon, always seeking what he knew Army forces needed in a fight—things they did not always get. Creech was a strong supporter of what Starry wanted, but often the Air Staff in the Pentagon had other ideas. Starry longed for the day when the U.S. Air Force would give the Tactical Air Command the same responsibility for developing doctrine as he had in the Army.

Following his four years at TRADOC, Starry was assigned to U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM), the forerunner of today's Central Command. While there, he felt that joint doctrine was something that he could handle better than the Joint Staff. He tried hard to get this responsibility but lost out to parochial interests on the part of the Joint Staff. Even today, the Joint Staff is reluctant to provide this authority to the current counterpart to REDCOM, Joint Forces Command.

Press On! has a wealth of information for those who want to understand better how to build and train an army. Starry's principles are just as applicable today as they were in the 1970s and 1980s. A zealot for the armored force, his "Tanks Forever" article that ran in *ARMOR* magazine, July-August 1975 (included in *Press On!*), is a masterpiece in explaining why tanks are necessary. Always believing that the secret to winning is not in numbers but in mobility, he steadfastly sought to restore mobility to battle. He advocated that "properly employed, the tank not only can survive on the battlefield, [but] it will dominate the battle." As in many of his speeches, he ends that article with the statement that "the clear lesson of war is that in the end, the outcome of battle depends on the excellence of training, the quality of leadership and the courage of our soldiers. It is also quite clear that the side that thinks it will win, usually does."

On more than one occasion when Starry gave a talk on leadership or discussed values, he used four Cs to express his personal views. These were competence, commitment, candor and courage. Those four words speak volumes about GEN Donn A. Starry. He has a legion of devoted followers, and I count myself as one of them.

Note: *Press On!* is not commercially available. The Army is placing sets in its major libraries and research facilities. Other needs are being met by making the entire work accessible online at http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp.

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Evolution of WWII Pacific Strategy

Allies Against the Rising Sun: The United States, the British Nations, and the Defeat of Imperial Japan. *Nicholas Evan Sarantakes. University Press of Kansas. 458 pages; maps; black-and-white photographs; index; $39.95.*

By COL Stanley L. Falk
AUS retired

The possible participation of British armed forces in the final assault on Japan was one of the most contentious issues to be settled between the United States and its World War II British allies. Both sides wrestled with this question, both within their own military and political quarters and with each other. If British ground, air and naval forces were to be involved, how, when and where would they be committed and with what types and size of forces? This problem has been addressed in a few previous publications, but Nicholas Sarantakes, who teaches at the U.S. Naval War College, has written probably the most detailed description of the arguments and negotiations within and between the United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada: *Allies Against the Rising Sun.*

This comprehensive, widely researched account focuses on three crucial issues. Why, in the first place, did Britain want to take part in the invasion of Japan and in operations leading up to it? Secondly, why did the Commonwealth nations, with little popular support at home for their inclusion, nevertheless insist on joining in? Finally, why did the United States accept British and Commonwealth participation despite strong military arguments against this?

Sarantakes argues that the primary motivations of all the allies were political rather than military. Both London and Washington ultimately understood that postwar cooperation between the two allies would rest in large measure on British contributions to the decisive operations of the war. British attempts to simply regain their lost Asian colonies rather than joining the final assault on Japan could well turn American public opinion against continuation of the successful wartime collaboration between the two nations. The British also hoped to demonstrate to the Australians their willingness to stand with them to defend their interests. The Commonwealth nations, in turn, hoped to increase their influence and standing with Great Britain while also strengthening Britain's ability to promote their interests in world affairs. The United States understood that heavy American casualties that might have been alleviated by British participation in the anticipated bloody Japanese invasion would be disastrous politically at home. And all concerned basically realized that a cooperative effort against Japan would serve the interests of all the allies, not simply those of any particular one.

These conclusions were not easily reached, however. The arguments within the British government between

Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his senior military leaders were particularly acrimonious. Churchill continued to insist on regaining Britain's lost Far East possessions: "I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire," he declared. He consistently argued for operations in Southeast Asia, particularly the recapture of Singapore, rather than focusing on invading Japan. The British chiefs of staff in turn viewed such operations as peripheral, arguing for what they insisted was the more proper and efficient use of British forces to assault Japan directly.

The struggle in London continued throughout the war—Churchill clinging stubbornly to his views, then appearing to yield to the chiefs' arguments, and then reversing himself shortly afterwards. Not until the eve of the July 1945 Potsdam Conference did the prime minister finally acquiesce in the chiefs' view of Pacific strategy. It had been a long, hard struggle that constantly infuriated his military advisors.

The disagreements within the American government were mild by comparison. President Franklin D. Roosevelt favored British participation and left it to his Joint Chiefs to work out the strategic details. With one exception, all favored British inclusion in the final operations. Only ADM Ernest J. King, the chief of naval operations, strongly opposed the introduction of British fleet units into the Pacific, a position he held without success throughout the war. Other questions that had to be ironed out concerned command and control, logistics, the utilization of British airpower, and the precise use to be made of British and Australian forces, but these were ultimately settled by the American chiefs of staff and their British counterparts.



In describing these developments, Sarantakes provides detailed biographical portraits of all the key individuals involved—Britons, Americans, Australians, New Zealanders and others. He goes deep into the discussions in London and Washington as well as in the capitals of the British dominions. Also, to show some of the pressures on Japanese and American leaders, he offers detailed chapters on the firebombing of Japan and the fierce land and sea struggle for Okinawa. Other chapters cover the roles of British fleet units in supporting the Okinawa campaign and in other late operations.

Concentrating as it does on the great strategic decisions about British involvement, *Allies Against the Rising Sun* has practically nothing to say about earlier important British and Australian contributions to the war against Japan. British operations opposing large Japanese formations in Burma and the crushing defeat inflicted on the latter are scarcely mentioned. Nor is there a single reference to the essential role of Australian forces in halting and turning back the initial Japanese offensive in New Guinea in 1942—nor to the continued efforts of Australian and New Zealand land, sea and air forces to hold and destroy Japanese forces in that area.

Indeed, at one point most of the divisions in GEN Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area command were Australian. Finally, Sarantakes has nothing at all to say about the vital Anglo-American collaborative efforts in communications intelligence or, for that matter, in the development of the atomic bomb that ultimately brought about Japan's surrender.

These omissions are disappointing but not critical to Sarantakes' main theme. *Allies Against the Rising Sun* is an important volume that throws considerable new light on the evolution of Pacific strategy in World War II. For American readers, it is particularly valuable for showing the difficult, acrimonious relationship between Churchill and his chiefs of staff. That picture alone is worth the price of the book.

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